A Wee Thought While For My Journey to Oz
It occurs to me in my new paper on the invisible hand, as it became in mid-20th century economics, that it is worth considering what happens after those merchants who are risk-averse to foreign trade and, in consequence, invest locally rather than take the greater risks (as perceived by them, but not all merchants - many do invest abroad, of course), which Adam Smith observed, benefitted the national economy (the whole is the sum of its parts), that the tale ought not to end there.
Modern economists generalise from the narrow case which Smith discusses in Wealth Of Nations (WN IV.ii.1-9) to make the bold - near heroic! - assertion that self-interested people end-up benefitting the public by acting on their self-interest. Milton Friedman (among many others) celebrated this assertion, supposedly attributed to Adam Smith.
However, consider the real consequences of a national policy of investing as much as possible domestically. True (absolutely true), the more merchants who invested in profitable projects domestically, the larger would be national output (and employment) on grounds of the 'whole is the sum of its parts'.
'Tis but a short step from such a conclusions for the same domestic merchants delivering their outputs locally for some of them (it only takes a few, even one) to realise that they can raise their profits yet more by curbing rival suppliers from competing in the same domestic markets.
One obvious target is foreign traders sending foreign outputs to doemstic markets - including those domstic marchants who exported abroad and returned with foreign goods to sell domesticlaly. Of domestic merchants, confined to the domestic market, having been 'led by an invisible hand', the temptation to go for retrictive tariffs and outright protection by prohibition must become real.
So, being led by an invisible hand to forego profitable trade with foreigners (Smith's narrow example), they are likely to promote protectionism, to narrow the competition for local consumers by widening the market for domestic merchants.
The question occurs to me: are they led by an invisible hand to take this step?
We can ask ourselves: which group of merchants usually prefer tariffs and prohibitions against foreign traders? Which lobbies their legislators and those who influence them to this end? Is it the domestic merchants primarily, or is it those merchants who invest in foreign trade?
I conclude (for short), that the merchants engaged in domestic trade only (driven by their risk aversion from foreign trade) are the most likely proponents of tariffs and prohibitions on imports, and not the less risk averse domestic merchants who do engage in foreign trade.
As there is unlikely to be an invisible hand at work leading domestic merchants to prefer tariffs and prohibitions (the latter also brought about by narrow national interests - 'jealousy of trade'), which must make the general interpretation of the doctrine of invisible hands, as a special, limited, and partial phenomena. Smith, of course, knew this, and he also knew he was not making a general recommendation against foreign trade. Modern economists, 200 years on, ought to know this too.
What went wrong?
Modern economists generalise from the narrow case which Smith discusses in Wealth Of Nations (WN IV.ii.1-9) to make the bold - near heroic! - assertion that self-interested people end-up benefitting the public by acting on their self-interest. Milton Friedman (among many others) celebrated this assertion, supposedly attributed to Adam Smith.
However, consider the real consequences of a national policy of investing as much as possible domestically. True (absolutely true), the more merchants who invested in profitable projects domestically, the larger would be national output (and employment) on grounds of the 'whole is the sum of its parts'.
'Tis but a short step from such a conclusions for the same domestic merchants delivering their outputs locally for some of them (it only takes a few, even one) to realise that they can raise their profits yet more by curbing rival suppliers from competing in the same domestic markets.
One obvious target is foreign traders sending foreign outputs to doemstic markets - including those domstic marchants who exported abroad and returned with foreign goods to sell domesticlaly. Of domestic merchants, confined to the domestic market, having been 'led by an invisible hand', the temptation to go for retrictive tariffs and outright protection by prohibition must become real.
So, being led by an invisible hand to forego profitable trade with foreigners (Smith's narrow example), they are likely to promote protectionism, to narrow the competition for local consumers by widening the market for domestic merchants.
The question occurs to me: are they led by an invisible hand to take this step?
We can ask ourselves: which group of merchants usually prefer tariffs and prohibitions against foreign traders? Which lobbies their legislators and those who influence them to this end? Is it the domestic merchants primarily, or is it those merchants who invest in foreign trade?
I conclude (for short), that the merchants engaged in domestic trade only (driven by their risk aversion from foreign trade) are the most likely proponents of tariffs and prohibitions on imports, and not the less risk averse domestic merchants who do engage in foreign trade.
As there is unlikely to be an invisible hand at work leading domestic merchants to prefer tariffs and prohibitions (the latter also brought about by narrow national interests - 'jealousy of trade'), which must make the general interpretation of the doctrine of invisible hands, as a special, limited, and partial phenomena. Smith, of course, knew this, and he also knew he was not making a general recommendation against foreign trade. Modern economists, 200 years on, ought to know this too.
What went wrong?
Labels: Invisible Hand, Milton Friedman
