Review Commentary No. 6: Milgate and Stimson's "After Adam Smith"

Murray Milgate and Shannon C. Stimson's "After Adam Smith; a century of transformation in politics and political economy”, Princeton, Princeton University Press 2009

[My series of review commentaries has been delayed unavoidably due to domestic upheavals mentioned in recent announcements. I am now almost back to normal, though my library appears to be missing several volumes.]

Chapter 7 is on Thomas Malthus (1766-1834), whose name is immortalized. He intervened with a polemic in the 1790s on the revolutionary fervour of the likes of Britain’s William Godwin (1756-1836) and France’s Condorcet (1743–1794). The latter admired Adam Smith, whose Enlightenment association with the radical Frenchman, however, caused judicial enquires to be made in 1793 about Smith’s possible role in spreading unrest among British labourers in the shadow of the French Terror.

Malthus raised the issue of population exceeding the capacity of an economy to sustain living standards and Milgate and Stimson take us through the issues clearly for the most part. However, I sensed an orthodox treatment of the so-called ‘Malthusian’ vision as representative of economics as the ‘dismal science’, crowned with the ‘classic statement that this came from Carlyle’ (122), without their explanatory comment, as if it referred to Malthus.

The origins of the ‘dismal science’ accolade, regularly awarded to economics, classical and modern, had little to do with Malthus, and Milgate and Stimson should have taken the opportunity to say so. I refer readers to a paper by David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart: “The Secret History of the Dismal Science. Part I. Economics, Religion and Race in the 19th Century” HERE which sets out the real story of economics becoming known as the ‘dismal science', wich they show had nothing to do with a description of Thomas Malthus:

‘While this story is well-known, it is also wrong, so wrong that it is hard to imagine a story that is farther from the truth. At the most trivial level, Carlyle's target was not Malthus, but economists such as John Stuart Mill, who argued that it was institutions, not race, that explained why some nations were rich and others poor. Carlyle attacked Mill, not for supporting Malthus's predictions about the dire consequences of population growth, but for supporting the emancipation of slaves. It was this fact—that economics assumed that people were basically all the same, and thus all entitled to liberty—that led Carlyle to label economics "the dismal science." ‘

Given the status of Carlyle, I think no opportunity should be taken to refrain from repeating the canard of the ‘dismal science’ in relation to Malthus, or, if it cannot be resisted, then at least economists should mention from whom – and WHY - the label originated. Carlyle’s ‘dismal science’ article was called ‘The N-----‘ Question, in one edition and in others, the less offensive title of ‘The Negro Question’ (though the contents are equally offensive).

Milgate and Stimson make a clear presentation of the evolution of the population ideas of Malthus in the various editions, without getting bogged down in the intricacies of Malthus’s argument.

I noted one interesting gem among these pages, namely that Malthus in the Quarterly Review for 1824 ‘maintained, like Smith, that in the presence of positive profits, exchangeable value was no longer determined by the quantity of labour employed to obtain them’ (132). This is a view I have expressed for some years. Smith did not have a labour theory of value except in ‘rude’ society, before the emergence of property and capital – but I have been unable to convince many others, so far.

What I also found fascinating was the Milgate and Shannon’s discussion of Malthus on ‘unintended consequences’ (133-35) and the distinction between ‘unintended’ and ‘unforeseen’.

They write that people are not relieved “of moral authority for their actions for “ignorance and inattention” and add that “Smith has also placed accountability ‘to God and his fellow creatures’ at the centre of an individual’s character as a moral being’ (giving the reference as ‘(1976 -85, 6:52) (134), which I could not find. However, I am familiar with an alternative reference, from which paragraphs were moved and some dropped for the 6th edition (1790), including the following:

“[3] A moral being in an accountable being but an accountable being, as the word expressed, is a being who must give an account of his actions to some other, and that consequently must regulate them according to the good liking of this other. Man is accountable to God and his fellow creatures. But tho’ he is, no doubt, principally accountable to God, in the order of time, he must necessarily conceive of himself as accountable to his fellow creatures before he can form any idea pf the Deity, or of the rules by which the Divine Being will judge of his conduct.”) (TMS III.3: page 135, footnote 1).

This was withdrawn for the 6th edition, as part of extensive revisions Smith undertook to Moral Sentiments that had the effect of diluting many of the religious passages to make TMS more secular and less religious. Malthus was quoting from earlier editions of TMS [See my “The Hidden Adam Smith in his Alleged Theology”, January 2010). HERE:

Milgate and Shannon fail to discuss, what ought to be perhaps, a mystery of the absence in Malthus of mentions of Adam Smith’s use of the “invisible hand”, if modern economists are correct in their assertion that this was Smith’s great idea, concept, or paradigm. The absence of discussion of the metaphor in Malthus, who had read Wealth of Nations closely, is worthy of discussion. They refer instead to references to the metaphor appearing in the works of evangelical Christian economists, such as Thomas Chalmers (136).

To date, I have not looked closely at these references (they cite Chalmers, 1832, On Political Economy, in connexion with the moral state and moral prospects of Society, Glasgow: Collins). In this context, Milgate and Stimson introduced me A. M. C. Waterman (1991) Revolution, Economics, and Religion, Christian political economy, Cambridge University Press). A sign of a great book is when it prompts readers follow lines of enquiry on issues of interest; I am sure that historians of economic thought will also find many prompts in this book of a similar kind.

They give some explanation for Malthus not mentioning the invisible hand: ‘Malthus could not longer make use of the invisible hand (nor indeed any other classical economist) as Smith had done – a felicitous metaphor for informing ordinary people’s perceptions of market society’ (137). They suggest it was because Malthus, ‘writing nearly a quarter of a century after Smith, and from within a more fractious political and economic context, Malthus could not make use of the invisible hand’ (137). Extraordinary is one word for the validity of this proposition. Waterman is quoted as saying that “Malthus “formulated an ‘invisible hand theorem’ in regard of ‘moral restraint’ as a form of an ‘unintended consequence’. Highly imaginative springs to mind! And nothing to do with Adam Smith’s use of the metaphor in my considered view.

I liked the reference to Malthus (1803) wishing to amend Smith’s syllabi for the parish schools to include ‘the simplest principles of political economy’ to ‘reading, writing and account’ (138).

In summary, Milgate and Stimson will enlighten readers who are currently confined to the mechanics of the population problem and, perhaps, will draw them into wider reading – it has me!

If I may recommend to those interested in the deeper significance of the population debate, I would suggest reading Greg Clarke’s, A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World (Princeton Economic History of the Western World) (Princeton University Press, 2007).

[I shall next report on Chapter 8 Utility, Property, and Political Participation next.]

Property is Civilisation

Fred Bauer writes (24 May) in the Blog, New Majority.com (‘Building a conservatism that can win again’) HERE:

“Republican Equality

Theories of the free market have long concerned themselves with the role of inequality. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith famously argues that the development of advanced modes of production and commerce undermined the stark inequalities of the feudal world. The thirst of the rich for luxuries such as diamond buckles led to a breakdown of the system of feudal-agricultural dependence, in which wealthy landholders held not merely economic but also political domination of those below them.

Smith's argument has two salient implications for the current political right/classical liberals/conservatives: (1) certain forms of radical economic inequality can result in significant political inequalities (witness the petty tyrannies of medieval nobles), and (2) the functioning of the free market can serve as a way of mitigating these inequalities, of leading to a turnover of wealth, of making differences in levels of income less poisonous for civil liberties. The free market and inequality thus have a quarrelsome relationship: the market helps create inequalities, but it also undercuts the financial inequality of any given moment, allowing the rich to fall and the poor to rise. Inequality in results is a key characteristic of a market economy, and the very operations of a free exchange can prevent these inequalities from hardening into radical caste differences.

However -- and this is a crucial "however" -- the market itself, particularly in the wake of modern industrialization and certain forms of government intervention, can result in inequalities so vast that they begin to undermine a faith in free markets. And the growth of these radical inequalities can lead to a creeping sense of the hardening of financial differences. If one of the promises of the free market as a vehicle for an authentically liberal-democratic politics is in its ability to allow for social and economic mobility, increasing doubts about the existence of these mobilities also increases doubts about the efficacy of the market and its contribution to political equality. Radical inequalities and a sense of economic stagnation can in turn lead to a widespread rejection of the instruments of the free market and, more broadly, the free society.

The early twentieth century, that high tide of income inequality (the top .1% took home about 10 % of the national income in 1916), was also the high-water mark of the Socialist Party of America; Eugene V. Debs won 6% of the national vote in the fractious election of 1912.

Granted, the rise and fall of the SPA cannot be reduced to that single statistic, but wide income disparities perhaps set some of the conditions for this rise.
Aside from questions about social and economic ideals, this hard practical fact endures: in the modern welfare state, if a great majority believes that it can no longer economically advance, it has the political power to legislate the confiscation via taxation of the wealth of the rich. Now, this confiscation may not succeed in reducing inequality -- the grotesque inequalities of so many "workers' paradises" are built upon the failure of this confiscation to equalize -- but it can still be attempted. In addition to ethical objections about such a policy, a kind of economic hope as well as an economic fear serve to restrain this confiscatory enterprise.

The fear is that such governmental power could be turned against the members of a temporary majority; the hope is that the poor could, too, become rich, so they would want to be able to enjoy their wealth. But at a certain point, the fear of the misuse of power can recede before other, more immediate fears (such as starvation or death of exposure). Social mobility, on the other hand, feeds this hope. If one of the free market's benefits is social mobility, this mobility itself helps increase public support for the free market and protects it from overweening government.

The free market and government regulation are, then, both double-edged entities for issues of inequality. The free market can create radical inequalities through allowing a select coterie to dominate and entrench itself as an economic elite, but it can also unsettle entrenched elites and provide the hope of mobility through an open exchange; governmental regulations can prevent monopolies from forming and ensure limitations on the power of the extremely wealthy, but these very regulations can be tools for the hyper-rich to shut down the market and prevent competition.

Comment
When conservative-minded writers put their minds to work they often produce well thought out ideas. If only they translated into practical politics, but that’s another story.

Adam Smith’s writings on the decline of feudal-property relations in Britain shows an outstanding grasp of history and a deft hand at work, explaining the complex inter-actions between the ruling feudal lords and the newer, lower-order and despised trading merchants. Smith confined his remarks to silver buckle buying by some of the Lords (he lived in a man’s world), but we can be sure that much of the trinkets, brooches, rings, rare perfumes, silks and such like were destined for the Lords’ women.

Smith’s point was that the merchant traders brought luxury goods for the Lords to buy, who were increasingly tempted dispose of the main sources of their political power – their armed retainers – which troubled the leading Lord, the King, and those would-be Kings who eyed their throne, and oppressed the landed workers (hardly, incidentally, a ‘petty tyranny’; it served ‘petty’ ends, no doubt, but was brutal to its victims).

This was a long process, but the end result was an enfeebled aristocracy and a more vibrant merchant core, able to extract concessions from the king in parliament which gave them, eventually, an effective veto over the sovereign’s spending, legitimised by the outcome of a civil war. These Liberties constituted the constitutional monarchy that was 18th-century Britain.

Markets only continue what the consequences of the origination of property did way back in pre-history: create wealth (the 'annual output of the necessaries, conveniences, and amusements of life' and, inevitably, inequality. The great agricultural societies, growing from a long history of hunter-gatherer subsistence economies from 11,000 years ago in a small segment of the earth’s surface, were noticeable by their inequality, which extended way beyond economic inequality to political and religious inequality. Tribal property in territory preceded family and private property.

The great empires of Egypt, Babylon, India and China, were dominated by ruling elites that managed the hydraulic mysteries and seasonal timings of everything about everyday life for the vast majority of their peoples. The stone detritus of these former stone-built civilisations are spread across the Eurasian continents, north Africa, and in parts of central and south America.

Their predecessor stone-age tool detritus is spread all round the world, into modern times too, which was the subsistence mode of every human society that did not grow into shepherding and farming. Those, few, modern, aimlessly discontented, people who have notions of going back to what they call, the ‘simpler’ life of pre-history, seem to have no idea what that would involve, including the mass extermination of about 6 billion people.

For tens of millennia, the inequality of the world’s population remained constant, with a small elite monopolising the power, and almost everybody else living on subsistence and almost static per capita levels. That is until, again in parts of Europe, commercial society from the 14th century began, slowly, to revive after a thousand years of stagnation, Black Death, endless wars, and social strife, since roughly it was after the fall of the Western Roman empire.

And within four centuries, in Britain, economics, technological and social change, and the unprecedented steady, cinpound interest of the albeit minute rise in per capita incomes finally broke through the petty cycles of the 'Malthusian Trap', ironically almost coterminous with its identification by Thomas Malthus.

These events created social inequalities of a new kind – that between societies that developed institutions capable of ensuring the necessary conditions for continuous, though small, growth rates and those societies – the majority – not capable for various reasons of breaking out of their subsistence economies. The unequal poor in the commercial societies were incomparably better off than those in the unequal traditional societies, claimed Smith in Wealth Of Nations.

It is that comparative inequality that is the distinction brought about by the social evolution of early commercial societies into what became known as capitalism from the mid-19th century. It is a phenomenon that the Left do not acknowledge and the conservatives do not yet accept. There is nothing ordained about the existing arrangements of Big State capitalism or Big Welfare States that will ensure their continuation in their present forms.

The task of the philosopher, said Adam Smith, is to observe and seek to understand; it is not to do anything to intervene with panaceas and social engineering. Philosophers must be wary of becoming 'men (and women) of system' (TMS VI.II.2.17-18: 233-4)

Small Note of Smith and Malthus

Mir Mahfuz ur Rahman writes in The Daily Star Blog:

“Rice haves versus rice have-nots” (HERE)

ONE of the basic necessities of a commodity's availability is trade. Adam Smith, in his seminal work in 1776, had shown that comparative advantage of nations through trade was the key to increasing the economic wealth of all nations.

Rev. Thomas Malthus put forth the idea of a future world where a majority of the people starves due to lack of food. Given the circumstances of the world in the past two years, Rev. Malthus may be considered a sage even though he himself, as a man of God, may not have been happy about the reality of his prediction.”

Comment
Adam Smith’s trade theory was based on absolute advantage – a country trades what it is better at than others, for what goods they are better than it. Comparative Advantage was a theory advanced by David Ricardo in 1817.

Thomas Malthus described a ‘law of nature’ that had operated for thousands of years: the ‘Mathusian Trap’, namely that as subsistence rose, population would grow (more babies survive, life expectancies increase), but population would eventually run ahead of the necessary subsistence to support it, and subsistence would fall per capita, reducing population as infant morality increased and life spans shortened.

The irony was that just as Malthus was publishing his population theory, Britain was experiencing rising per capita consumption and rising population and the Malthusian Trap was not sprung because food output exceeded population growth in the industrialising commercial societies and has continued to do so for the past two hundred years. (See: Gregory Clark: A Farewell to Alms" (Princeton University Press, 2007)