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Murray Rothbard’s Myths about Adam Smith
Gavin Kennedy
Murray N. Rothbard,
the late and distinguished contributor to the von Mises’ school of
Austrian economics, wrote a chapter (‘The Myth of Adam Smith’)
in
An Austrian Perspective on the
History of Economic Thought,
and a large extract from it was published in January 2006 on the Ludwig
von Mises’ Institute’s Blog.
During January and March I wrote six pieces criticising Rothbard’s
assertions, reproduced here with minor editorial corrections.
1
In, if I may say so, an appropriate Rothbardian fashion (no prisoners,
no ambiguity, no wasted prose), the von Mises Institute announced its
re-publication of Rothbard’s classic in a blurb typical of Rothbard’s
pugilistic style:
“In an essay that made his
masterpiece on the history of
thought
famous, Murray Rothbard argues that Adam Smith's should not be called
the founder of economics, nor a theorist who improved on economic
science, nor even a consistent defender of the market economy. Rothbard
sees him as unoriginal, confused, opportunistic, vastly overrated, and
even dishonest. Yet this except is only a tiny bit of what you will find
in this 2-volume wonder”.
I have read, so far, a few of Rothbard’s contributions (I am working my
way through von Mises’ “Human Action”
amidst other duties)
and should not comment at this time on Austrian economics in general
until I am familiar with the Austrian approach, which strikes me, from
recent acquaintance with the Mises Institute Blog, as formidable, at
least in its certitudes about everything. However, I am familiar with
the life and works of Adam Smith and spend a deal of time correcting
obvious errors broadcast about him. To that extent I agree that there
are many myths about the man, his writings and his ideas, and I title
this critical essay on Rothbard’s ‘The Myth of Adam Smith’
as ‘Murray Rothbard’s Myths about Adam Smith’.
Given the length of Murray Rothbard’s slamming critique,
I cannot reply to it in the detail it requires in a single Blog
contribution and I shall return to other aspects of Rothbard’s essay in
future Blogs. While Murray Rothbard (1925-1995) cannot reply, nor can
Adam Smith (1723-90), but I am sure we can conduct critical discussion
without lacking in manners.
My first point of detail concerns Rothbard’s reference to “Sir James
Steuart's (1712-80) outdated two-volume work, Principles of Political
Œconomy (1767).” Rothbard treats Smith’s neglect to mention in
“Wealth of Nations”, Sir James Steuart’s then recently published book as
evidence of something underhand and suspicious (so did Salim Rashid),
both hinting that Smith’s neglect was responsible, somehow, for
Steuart’s book not doing as well as it might have done. I quote from
Rothbard:
“… Sir James Steuart's (1712-80) outdated two-volume work, Principles
of Political Oeconomy (1767). Steuart, a Jacobite who had been involved
in Bonnie Prince Charlie's rebellion, was for much of his life an exile
in Germany, where he became imbued with the methodology and ideals of
German 'cameralism.' Cameralism was a virulent form of absolutist
mercantilism that flourished in Germany in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Cameralists, even more than western European
mercantilists, were not economists at all—that is, they did not analyse
the processes of the market but were technical advisers to rulers on how
and in what way to build up state power over the economy. Steuart's
Principles was in that tradition, scarcely economics but rather a call
for massive government intervention and totalitarian planning, from
detailed regulation of trade to a system of compulsory cartels to
inflationary monetary policy.
“Even though Steuart's Principles was out of step with the emerging
classical liberal Zeitgeist, it was no foregone conclusion that the
work would have little or no influence. The book was well received,
highly respected, and sold very well, and five years after its
publication, in 1772, Steuart won out over Adam Smith in acquiring a
post as monetary consultant to the East India Company.”
Adam Smith was not a Jacobite. His father had a credible record of
commitment to the Hanoverian King’s cause and was an active party to the
Unionist shenanigans that led to the merger of the parliaments of
Scotland with England in 1707 (the Crowns were unified in 1603). Yet
Smith was not a person who carried political differences into personal
relationships.
His first
published writing was his preface to the publication of William
Hamilton’s Poems on Several Occasions in 1748. Hamilton was a
Jacobite in exile, who was pardoned later. So, Smith had no personal or
political reason to ostracise Steuart or his book. Indeed, we know he
regularly conversed with him after his discreet return from exile in
1763, when Smith returned from his Tour of France in 1766. As Smith
directed some of his polemics against mercantile political economy in
“Wealth of Nations” to confute Steuart’s ‘false principles’, he hardly
ignored Steuart’s book, though he admitted, proudly, that he did this
‘without mentioning’ Steuart or his book:
“I have the same opinion of Sir James Stewarts Book that you have.
Without once mentioning it, I flatter myself that every principle in it,
will meet with a clear and distinct confutation in mine.”
I cannot
think of many, if any, occasions in which Smith criticised a living
person’s writings by name, though he could be robust with the named
writings of those who were dead. It may have had something to do with an
old fashioned sense of the proprieties common among gentlemen in
18th-century Scotland. It was quite common in published works, well into
the 19th century, for authors to refer to people’s names with most
letters blanked out. For example, James Steuart would have been referred
to as: ‘J-------------t’.
Given Steuart’s theme in favour of mercantile-state building, I consider
its failure as a book after 1772 had more to do with its contents than
to any sales it might have received if Smith had identified it in 1776.
It took some time before “Wealth of Nations” made significant sales (a
point mocked at by Rashid). From what I know of the various editions of
Smith’s book they did not sell like hot cakes (he sent free copies to
many important people) and I would wager they made greater sales in
later editions in the 19th and 20th centuries than they did while he was
alive. Frederick List
lambasted Smith’s “Wealth of Nations” because it contained
vigorous criticism of mercantile state building, which List saw as the
foundation for German unification and nationalism. The consequences were
seen in the 20th Century.
Rothbard takes a side-swipe at Smith with gratuitously tendentious
implications:
“in 1772, Steuart won out
over Adam Smith in acquiring a post as monetary consultant to the East
India Company.”
This suggests that Smith had
applied for a post with the East India Company in competition with Sir
James Steuart and had lost the contest because Steuart was judged the
better monetary specialist. It could only convince someone who has no
idea of the facts.
For one thing, Steuart’s book circulated from 1767 and Smith did not
publish “Wealth of Nations” until 1776. For another, the facts of
the circumstances surrounding Smith’s name lying before directors of the
East India Company, who were looking for a specialist to advise them on
the currency problem they had in Bengal, rubbish Rothbard’s unworthy
implications. Smith did not apply for the post, as is clear in his
polite remarks to the person who had put his name forward without
consulting Smith first:
“I think myself very much honoured and obliged to you for having
mentioned me to the east India Directors as a person who could be of any
use to them. You have acted in your old way of doing your friends a good
office behind their backs, pretty much as other people do them a bad
one. There is no labour of any kind which you can impose on me which I
will not readily undertake. By what Mr Stewart and Mr Ferguson hinted to
me concerning your notion of the proper remedy for the disorders of the
coin in Bengal, I believe our opinions upon that subject are perfectly
the same”
‘Mr Ferguson’ was Adam Ferguson, and Smith’s spelling of Steuart’s name
is how the name was spelt in Scotland, whereas ‘Steuart’ or, more
commonly ‘Stuart’, is the English spelling.
And while discussing Rothbard’s ‘side-swipe’, I should mention the fact
that so-called ‘Bonnie Prince Charlie’ was neither ‘bonnie’ (check his
portrait!) nor a ‘Prince’. He was the foreign-speaking grandson of the
former British King, who had been deposed by constitutional means from
the throne in favour of the Hanoverian King William of Orange.
Charlie’s' father was a Pretender to the throne; his son’s claim to be a
Prince was false (‘treason never prospers, because if it prospers none
dare call it treason’). To describe Steuart as being ‘involved’ in
Charlie’s futile rebellion understates his role for he was his private
secretary, suggesting a more wholesome commitment to the Jacobite cause
than merely being ‘involved’ in it; many thousands were ‘involved’ in
the rebellion, but few became ‘private secretary’ to its leader.
2
The early
chapters of “Wealth of Nations” often irritate those in a hurry to read
it like a modern economics textbook. For example, Francis Horner
(1801) dismissed the significance of the early chapters:
“This is a very superficial and unnecessary chapter; all that is
valuable in the doctrine of it stated in a single sentence. The
disquisition belongs rather to philosophy of the mind rather than to
political economy: and as a metaphysical investigation, it is treated in
a very slight and unsatisfying manner”
Two centuries later, Murray Rothbard, under cover of Schumpeter’s
prodigious authority, dismisses them too. It is Rothbard’s sweeping
opinion that for no “economist before or since did the division of
labour assume such a position of commanding importance.” To the extent
that this is true it reflects more on the unfortunate neglect by such
economists than any obsession Smith may have entertained about the
division of labour.
Rothbard considers the division of labour of trifling importance
compared to the exaggerated ‘undue’ and ‘commanding importance’ accorded
to it by Smith. This is a clear difference of opinion, not open to
resolution. However, Rothbard goes much further and throws about other,
more serious, charges against Smith. Beyond the crimes of exaggeration,
Rothbard adds those of downplaying the importance of ‘capital
accumulation and the growth of technological knowledge’; not ‘apply[ing]
his analysis of the division of labour to international trade; having
‘no inkling of the Industrial Revolution going on all about him’;
plagiarizing the example of the pin factory from the French
Encyclopédie (1755) and shifting ‘the main focus’ of the importance
of the division of labour ‘from mutual benefit to an alleged irrational
and innate 'propensity to truck, barter and exchange', as if human
beings were lemmings determined by forces external to their own chosen
purposes.’
After such a devastating broadside from a major post-war figure in
Austrian economics, supported by the authority of Schumpeter, a
veritable giant of the profession, it may be thought that Rothbard’s
abusive rhetoric, mustered in his intemperate chapter, was perfectly
justified. I think our American cousins call it ‘Slam Dunk’. But when
reading well-known sources, we should ignore the rhetoric and check the
solidity of the assertions.
This takes us to the core of the significance of the division or labour
for Smith. He was not writing a ‘Principles of Political Economy’
textbook, nor even a Treatise on a topic of an aspect of political
economy (currency, trade or agriculture, etc.,), or a set of lectures
for a moral philosophy class. “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of Nations” was the report of his answer to the
question embodied in its title. Elsewhere,
I have called it a ‘one-man Royal Commission’, after the procedure in
Britain, by which a government appoints independent worthies to enquire
into a subject of importance (the causes of crime, bad housing,
transport, genetically modified foods, drug addiction, and such like)
and then publishes their findings a few years later. “Wealth of
Nations” should be read with that image in mind.
It is appropriate that Smith opens his report by taking a long view into
the evolutionary history of factors bound up with the causes of the
wealth of nations. Smith was aware that outside the perimeter of
European societies there were very different societies elsewhere on
Earth, some with ancient civilisations (India, China) and others
commonly referred to as examples of the lives of the ‘Brutes’, or the
kind of ‘savage’ societies that once were considered to have been the
norm for all humans (e.g., Locke’s assertion in 1690 that in the
‘beginning all the world was America’).
That he leant heavily on the division of labour as a primary cause of
the differences between the savage societies in America and Africa, and
the civilised present of Western Europe is justifiable. That he was
wrong in details and he knew nothing of the hundreds of thousands of
years of the human and proto-human societies as they had evolved, is
readily conceded, but other disciplines could now show those economists,
who hasten past these insights, quite fundamental gaps in their
understanding of human behaviour, of which subject they (including the
Austrians) claim a unique sovereignty.
In “Adam Smith’s Lost Legacy”, I criticise the extent to which
Smith’s name has become ‘practically synonymous’ with the division of
labour and the extent of the market, and I try to ‘lay this myth to
rest’.
That he ignored others who had discussed the division of labour is not
entirely supported by thee vidence of his text. In “Wealth of Nations”,
he draws attention to previous views on the division of labour. He gives
clear evidence of others before himself, presumably in the pamphlet
literature that he does not bother to cite in detail, expressing their
views on the division of labour before he did:
‘[The division of labour] is commonly supposed to be carried
furthest in some very trifling’ manufactures’ and he continues in this
theme to identify ‘great manufacturers’ that cannot collect all of their
workmen into ‘the same workhouse’ in a single place (large workplaces
were rare in mid-18th century Scotland, excluding mines), and they
necessarily disperse them such that the work is ‘divided into a greater
number of parts’ and ‘the division [of labour] is not near so obvious,
and has accordingly been much less observed’,
but that he acknowledged that it was observed by others (from the words
in my italics) is certain.
Smith introduces the ‘pin maker’, but note (read carefully!) he writes
that the division of labour in the ‘very trifling manufacture’ of pins ‘has
been very often taken notice of’ (my italics). Again Smith makes no
claim to precedence or pretence at originality, contrary to Rothbard’s
assertions. The tense of ‘has been very often taken notice of’ is clear:
the ‘notice’ that others took of the division of labour was in the past,
i.e., before “Wealth of Nations” (1776); the Encyclopédie was published
in 1755, 21 years earlier, and its contents were widely known to
contemporaries interested in political economy (Smith had copies in his
library).
Smith taught the division of labour since he arrived at Glasgow College
(1751) and it was also expounded by Francis Hutcheson while Smith was a
student (1737-40), and by Plato, William Petty (1683) and many others.
Acknowledging observations by others, which were well known to his
readers, is hardly grounds to accuse him of plagiarism two hundred years
later. In the interim, the pamphlet literature, about which Rothbard
and Rashid make a great deal of fuss, was not treated as seriously as it
is today by scholars with Internet access to libraries that store
copies.
Rothbard makes an extraordinary assertion:
“The older and truer perception of the motive power for
specialization and exchange was simply that each party to an exchange
(which is necessarily two-party and two-commodity) benefits (or at least
expects to benefit) from the exchange; otherwise the trade would not
take place. But Smith unfortunately shifts the main focus from mutual
benefit to an alleged irrational and innate 'propensity to truck, barter
and exchange', as if human beings were lemmings determined by forces
external to their own chosen purposes.”
That it is older is agreed, that it is truer is problematical.
‘Specialisation and exchange’ narrows the domain of the division of
labour considerably unless Rothbard insists that the division of labour
was confined only to the era of commercial exchange. The division of
labour reached its modern fruition in the modern era of commerce, but it
had a long history through the four ages of man, from the
gathering-scavenging-hunting first stage onwards. Co-operation, an
essential ingredient in the division of labour, evolved through the
millennia in late proto-human (hominid) society; it did not just appear
suddenly and fully operational in early acts of exchange in human
society.
Co-operation in the scavenging or hunting of large game (larger than
adult men) required more than one common set of attributes. Age
separated man’s universal talents; the young ran faster, had strength
and seldom lacked the impetuousness that often passes for courage; the
older, perhaps lamer, certainly slower than the young, and nursing that
experience that often passes for guile, fulfilled different roles. These
were not necessarily solely innate differences; they were the product of
many incidents over their life-times, learned from the accidents of
experience and observation.
In an environment where violent predators competed for the same food
sources, a division of labour amongst humans had reproductive advantages
suitable to drive social evolution (a far faster form of evolution
compared to natural selection). Scavenging and hunting big game was
dangerous work for puny humans. While multi-tasking was possible and
such activities guided by superior intelligence gave humans a
competitive edge. Tracking and locating prey (already dead or suitable
for killing), trapping and stripping the kill or the abandoned carcass
quickly before rival predators, determined an able to kill anything in
their way, challenged them for possession, and withdrawing intact,
required knappers of stone tools, butchers and carriers, plus noisy
skirmishers to keep predators at bay long enough for the others to
complete their work. The nature of such work required a nascent division
of labour, some elementary forms of organisation and social cohesion.
Combined in a group there were many reproductive and survival advantages
in divisions of labour from innate and life-cycle differences. That
Smith asserts the absence of innate differences between porters and
philosophers is the result, ‘not so much from nature, as from habit,
custom, and education’ is an error regarding the relative importance of
nature versus nurture as root causes. If he insisted that the
differences were solely and absolutely caused by ‘habit, custom and
education’, he was wrong.
That we know differently today (though in some quarters it is still
controversial) is a result of two hundred years additional research, and
is commendable (education?), but hardly a decisive dismissal of Smith’s
complicity in common enough errors of his time and afterwards. (I wish I
could feel so certain of everything I assert as Murray Rothbard's
self-confidence in everything he asserted.)
What is important is Smith’s denial that the division of labour was
‘derived’ from ‘the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and
intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion’.
He says much the same thing in relation to the origins and evolution of
language.
He went on to argue that much the same process is behind the evolution
of markets and their workings, though he obfuscated how markets work
from introducing Shakespeare’s metaphor of the invisible hand,
clouding his clarity of how markets work with the unfortunate
interpretation of those (the majority?) who came to see markets as
‘miraculous’ and mysterious, even though Smith’s single use of the
metaphor in “Wealth of Nations” appears in a passage not directly
related to markets.
Only much later in the evolution of the division of labour into the
creation of wealth (goods created by human toil), when the divisions of
labour had spread through co-operation, did it lead towards ‘truck,
barter and exchange [of] one thing for another’. Extended families and
small bands created their future histories in the empty wildernesses of
the Earth, as their descendants migrated through adjacent territories
and then continents, and proliferated into regular contact with other
descendants from Africa. It was contact amongst long separated human
bands that drove social evolution into exchange relationships (and the
ever present phenomenon of violent plunder).
Here Rothbard separates himself from Smith’s view of the essential
attribute of human exchange. He confuses motive with means; he makes the
mistake he accuses Smith of committing. He writes:
“simply that each party to an exchange (which is necessarily
two-party and two-commodity) benefits (or at least expects to benefit)
from the exchange; otherwise the trade would not take place.”
Yes, but, though each party unambiguously “benefits from the exchange”,
where did the only practice that could realise the mutual benefits of
trading come from, and, as important, how does exchange take place
without what Smith calls the propensity for bargaining? Is Rothbard
suggesting that it came exogenously “as if human beings were lemmings
determined by forces external to their own chosen purposes”? Surely not!
It must have come from their attempts to realise those tentative
benefits, which Smith suggested was the mechanism for trade – the
behaviour that makes it happen:
‘the necessary, though very slow and gradual consequence of a certain
propensity in human nature which has no such extensive utility; the
propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another’.
Concentrate on the words: ‘very slow and gradual consequence of a
certain propensity’. This is Smith’s evolutionary social model. It was
not a result of a rational decision to exchange, which everybody adopted
simultaneously after reading von Mises and Rothbard in the mid-20th
century; humans discovered the alternatives (plunder or trade) to
acquiring wealth they had not created themselves through an evident
propensity that was one of the ‘original principles in human nature of
which no further account can be given’. The behaviours of our ancient
predecessors did not fossilise and no trace of how they behaved or what
they thought remains.
Smith’s
other option for the origins of the propensity are ‘the necessary
consequence of the faculties of reason and speech’.
In short, he did not know for certain which option it might have been,
or if there was a third option (by rational deduction in the Austrian
tradition). He did not state that ‘irrational’ propensity was definitely
‘innate’; he did not know for sure and he left the two alternatives for
future scholarship.
Two centuries later, Rothbard asserts he knows the answer for certain.
And how does he know for certain? Because he thought it through
rationally and with the benefit of two hundred years of modern
scholarship that is held in vast libraries, none of which was available
to Adam Smith in Kirkcaldy in 1766, when he wrote the opening chapters
of “Wealth of Nations”.
The alternative to bargaining for the benefits was/is violent plunder,
which no doubt many tried instead, some ‘winning’ and as many ‘losing’
(the plunderers were out plundered by their supposed victims). Trading
behaviour has always been a ‘propensity’, not a mandate. Where non-zero
sum trade happens it raises the wealth of its participants, whereas
plunder raises the wealth of the ‘winning’ party, net of its real costs
– dead and wounded, and the ever present threat from surviving remnants
of the ‘losers’ - which reduces or eliminates potential benefits from
one-way violent zero-sum transactions.
Trade does not just take place. It has to be negotiated. It is both a
process and an outcome. The parties have to ‘persuade’ each other to
transact.
The fact that mainstream economics ignores Smith’s ‘propensity to truck,
barter and exchange’ (negotiation) as the fundamental characteristic of
trade, is a criticism of economists (including the Austrian variety),
not Adam Smith.
3
Murray
Rothbard
asserts the following unfair criticism plus an elementary error:
“In addition, Smith failed to apply his analysis of the division of
labour to international trade, where it would have provided powerful
ammunition for his own free trade policies. It was to be left to James
Mill to make such an application in his excellent theory of comparative
advantage. Furthermore, domestically, Smith placed far too much
importance on the division of labour within a factory or industry, while
neglecting the more significant division of labour among industries.”
This is not central to my replies to Rothbard on Smith, but it typifies
his rhetoric, that he counts as a ‘failing’ in a predecessor, that
another political economist 50 or more years after he died, had ‘been
left’(?) to apply a theory which his predecessor had not created on his
own account. That John Stuart Mill elaborated on a concept on the back
of David Ricardo’s work is highly commendable (that is how science
progresses and evolves), but if we are to blame all predecessors for not
anticipating our insights in the centuries that follow them (and us!) we
would have a pretty jaundiced view of the practice of science.
But look closely at the main charge against Smith. Rothbard asserts he
ignored the division of labour in ‘international trade’ and ‘the more
significant division of labour among industries.’ What breathtaking
forgetfulness on Rothbard’s part – it cannot possibly be caused by
Rothbard’s ignorance, for his reputation as a major scholar in economic
science is widely appreciated.
But to the facts. The famous ‘pin factory’ (of which
more later) was not the sole reference to the division of labour in “Wealth
of Nations”. It was only one ‘trifling’ paragraph example, chosen I
suspect to illustrate the principle of the division of labour and not to
exhaust it.
In the very next paragraph Smith writes:
“In every other art and manufacture, the effects of the division of
labour are similar to what they are in this very trifling one… The
division of labour, however, so far as it can be introduced, occasions,
in every art, a proportionable increase of the productive powers of
labour. The separation of the different trades and employments from one
another, seems to have taken place, in consequence of this advantage.
This separation too is generally carried furthest in those countries
which enjoy the highest degree of industry and improvement; what is the
work of one man, in a rude state of society, being generally that of
several in an improved one…. The labour too which necessary to produce
any one complete manufacture, is almost always divided among a great
number of hands. How many different trades are employed in each branch
of the linen and woollen manufactures, from the growers of the flax and
the wool, to the bleachers and smoothers of the linen, to the dyers and
dressers of the cloth!”
For Smith his survey of the application of the division of labour in
mid-18th century Scotland, and what we now know, but nobody did at the
time, was only the beginning of a deepening of commerce and industry on
a scale unprecedented in all of history that has not stopped yet,
concerned the ‘downstream’ processes of product groups (flax and wool)
because these were the most evident examples of the division of labour
at work in Smith's day. He did not ‘neglect’ the significance of the
division of labour ‘among’ industries at all. He wrote about them!
Only seven paragraphs on
Smith develops his lesser known (at least to those who rely on
abridgements and third-hand accounts of what Smith wrote, a charge
nobody could make against Rothbard) example of the division of labour,
that of the manufacture of the ‘accommodation’ of the ‘common
artificer’, which utilises a ‘number of people’ different industries who
contribute ‘a part’ to procurements of the common labourer. These people
must ‘join their different arts in order to complete even this homely
production’, writes Smith, and goes on to elaborate on the different
industries ‘in distant parts of the country’ and ‘a great multitude of
workmen’ needed to produce by their ‘joint labour’ the common labourer’s
woollen coat.
These different industries, according to Rothbard neglected by Smith,
include shepherds, weavers, fullers, ‘many merchants and carriers’,
commerce and navigation, ship-builders, sailors, sail-makers, rope
makers, drugs for dyers (‘from the remotest corners of the world’,
introducing an international trade element into his discourse, which
Rothbard calls Smith’s ‘failing’), tool-makers, makers of ‘complicated
machinery’ for ships, millers, and looms, even the ‘shears’ that ‘clip
the wool’, miners of coal and ore, builders of furnaces for smelting,
timber fellers, charcoal burners, brick-makers,, brick-layers, furnace
men, mill-wrights, forgers, smiths, all ‘joined in their different arts
in order to produce them’.
Smith, having mentioned the common labourers' other requirements in
dress, furniture, shirts, shoes, bed, kitchen grate, tables, furniture,
knives and forks, earthen and pewter plates, bread, beer, and glass
windows, concludes:
“If we examine, I say, all these things, and consider the variety of
labour employed about each of them, we shall be sensible that without
the assistance and co-operation of many thousands, the very meanest
person in a civilised country could not be provided, even according to,
what we very falsely imagine, the easy and simple manner in which he is
commonly accommodated”.
4
To conclude
the discussion on Smith’s alleged plagiarism of the division of labour I
shall turn to Murray
Rothbard’s own myths. He convinced
himself that he had found a ‘smoking gun’ in Smith’s version of the
division of labour and his quarrel with Adam Ferguson.
Closer analysis shows Rothbard quiet wrong in his borrowed
interpretation from
Professor Hamowy’s
'Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and the Division of Labour' :
“Professor Hamowy has shown
that Smith did not break with his old friend, as had previously been
thought, because of Ferguson's use of the concept of the division of
labour in his “Essay
on the History of Civil Society”
in 1767. In view of all the writers who had employed the concept
earlier, this behaviour would have been ludicrous, even for Adam Smith.
Hamowy conjectures that the break came in the early 1 780s, because of
Ferguson's discussion at their club of what would later be published as
part of his
Principles of Moral and Political Science
in 1792….
Thus Adam Smith broke up a
long-standing friendship by unjustly accusing Adam Ferguson of
plagiarizing an example which, in truth, both men had taken without
acknowledgement from the French Encyclopédie.”
Believing that such behaviour would have been ‘ludicrous’ on Smith’s
part should have been followed by Rothbard exercising caution in copying
these attributions from Professor Hamowys. I agree that their dispute
was not over the principle of the division of labour, because of
well-known common knowledge of their prior publication in more ancient
writings, as Smith acknowledges in his reference to the pin manufactory
example.
But what were their differences about then? Ferguson in his
History of Civic Society
(1767) introduced the relatively new proposition of the division of
labour causing what we now call ‘alienation’, a theme taken up by Smith
in ‘Wealth of Nations’.
If there was to be a quarrel over precedence it was more likely to be
the subject of alienation and not the principle of the division of
labour. Ferguson’s references to alienation pre-date ‘Wealth of
Nations’, but they do not pre-date his ‘Lectures
in Jurisprudence’ delivered between 1750
and 1764.
The fact that Smith's lecturers were not published until the end of the
19th century does not disqualify a quarrel over precedence in alienation
because several hundred persons heard his lectures, he spoke about his
ideas regularly in his clubs and ‘social hours’, and Ferguson mixed in
the same circles. The ‘lost’ lectures misled Karl Marx into attributing
to Ferguson precedence in ‘alienation’ theory, and describing him as the
‘teacher’ of Adam Smith and also Smith as his ‘pupil’!
But Smith had lectured in 1763
on alienation years before Ferguson published his version in 1767.
But was it really a quarrel, as Professor Hamowys claims and Rothbard
endorses, about the contents of a book Ferguson was to publish in 1792
(Smith died in 1790), or was it about something else published earlier
while Smith was alive? In the original report of the alleged charges by
Smith he is alleged to have accused Ferguson:
‘of
having borrowed some of his inventions without owning them. This
Ferguson denied, but owned he had derived many notions from a French
author, and that Smith had been there before him’
It was not just a ‘French source’ in the original quotation, but a
‘French Author’, and the best candidate for the French author is Baron
Montesquieu and his book, ‘Spirit
of the Law’ (1748), whose concepts and
ideas featured strongly in Smith’s lectures at Glasgow University, which
we know because he acknowledged Montesquieu six times (though not a
further 20 times). Speech does not lend itself to author citations and,
anyway, Smith never edited the students’ notes for accuracy, and his own
manuscript for Jurisprudence
was burned on his instructions a short while before he died. His
lectures were taken down by students and widely circulated – two copies
of which were discovered over 100 years later. Ferguson could not have
quoting from this source directly, but he could have been quoting from
another set of student notes (now lost) or, more likely from student’s
reports of Smith’s lectures circulating in the Edinburgh clubs.
Ferguson’s History of Civil
Society appeared in 1767 and in its first
edition he made no acknowledgement of Montesquieu’s work as a source,
and Smith would have recognised this deficiency. Indeed, Ferguson
published the following bizarre apology in the second 1773 edition:
‘In his [Montesquieu’s]
writings will be found, not only the original of what I am now, for the
sake of order, to copy from him, but likewise probably the source of
many observations, which in different places, I may, under the belief of
invention, have repeated without quoting the author.’
This leaves me to deal with the final and, if I may opine, gratuitously
false criticism of Smith on trivial arithmetical details (which Rothbard
also manages to get wrong!) of the famous pin manufactory example in ‘Wealth
of Nations’:
‘There is strong evidence
that the 'French source' for both writers was the article on Epingles
(pins) in the Encyclopédie (1755), since that article mentions 18
distinct operations in making a pin, the same number repeated by Smith
in the Wealth of Nations, although in English pin factories 25 was the
more common number of operations.’
What are we to make of this ‘evidence’? Is Rothbard arguing that the
alleged discrepancy between 18 (Encyclopédie) and 25 (England) shows he
had caught out Smith in a borrowed example? A closer reading of the
passage in ‘Wealth of Nations’ suggests otherwise.
First of all the ‘18’ operations are reported to have been ‘very often
taken notice of’ (p.14), i.e., sufficiently familiar to be common
knowledge by 1776 (21 years after the
Encyclopédie
article in 1755). Then Smith goes on to describe a ‘small pin
manufactory, which he states emphatically: ‘I have seen’
and Rothbard questions the veracity of this statement and, by
implication, adds to his charges that Smith was also a liar. However,
Smith’s actual statement says that he saw:
“a small
manufactory of this kind where ten men only were employed, and where
some of them consequently performed two or three distinct operations.
But though they were very poor, and therefore but indifferently
accommodated with the necessary machinery, they could when they exerted
themselves, make among them about twelve pounds of pins in a day. There
are in a pound upwards of four thousand pins of a middling size. Those
ten persons, therefore, could make among them upwards of forty-eight
thousand pins in a day. Each person, therefore, making a tenth part of
forty-eight thousand pins, might be considered as making four thousand
eight hundred pins a day. But if they had all wrought separately and
independently, and without any of them having been educated to this
peculiar business, they certainly could not each of them have made
twenty, perhaps not one pin in day; that is, certainly not the two
hundred and fortieth, perhaps not four thousand eight hundred part of
what they are at present capable of performing, in consequences of a
proper division and combination of their different operations”.
The pin manufactory Smith describes in detail does not include anything
about how many operations are involved, other than that among the ten
men ‘some of them consequently performed two or three distinct
operations.’ The ‘18’ operations cited by Rothbard as ‘evidence’ comes
from an earlier sentence in the paragraph!
So what is Rothbard’s ‘evidence’ for his gratuitous and false
implication that there was something untoward in Smith’s account of what
he saw? Rothbard’s assertion is that ‘the same number [18] is repeated
by Smith in the 'Wealth of Nations’ which shows he claims that he has
caught Smith out, because ‘in English pin factories 25 was the more
common number of operations’.
Unfortunately, Rothbard didn’t catch out anybody but himself in his
(careless) misreading of Adam Smith, and, er, by the way, I note that
Rothbard gave no citation for this statement about ‘25’ operations being
more common in ‘England’. Smith, incidentally, lived in Scotland and
Rothbard, like many North Americans, made the usual, and somewhat
irritating, mistake of talking about ‘England’, one of the four nations
making-up the United Kingdom, as if what happened in ‘England’ was
synonymous with what happened in Scotland and that Smith should have
known about pin factories south of the border, in days, remember, when
Edinburgh to London took a six-day coach journey.
It is possible that Rothbard did not read Chapter 1 in “Wealth of
Nations” with enough care (though he describes it has the book’s most
‘famous’ paragraph!) in pursuit of his intemperate accusation Smith’s
falsehoods. His normal standards of scholarly accuracy on this occasion
had slipped severely.
5
Murray Rothbard pounces of Adam Smith at the end of his extract on the
differences between ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive labour’ and
completely misses the point, as so many have, including Karl Marx (that
is a strange combination – Rothbard sharing something in common with
Karl Marx!).
Many people confuse ‘unproductive’ in Smith’s sense with ‘useless’ or
‘unimportant’ labour, when Smith’s distinction had nothing to do with
the merits or utility of labour. That the Physiocrats had similar
nomenclature for productive labour from their ‘produit
net’ is not relevant. Smith used the distinction in a different sense.
The Physiocrats confined their meaning to products of agriculture from
the biological fact that an amount of seed when planted and grown to
maturity resulted in a physically greater amount of seeds or food. That
this produit net was visible, obvious and beyond dispute (outside
droughts) was too obvious to be contested.
Remember, Smith’s book was a report on his ‘Inquiry
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations’.
It was not a textbook on political economy. It was a report on his
applications of political economy, as the subject existed in the
mid-18th century, plus whatever elements he added to his evolutionary
model of man in society from his perspectives of moral sentiments,
jurisprudence, and history. Its focus was on the wealth, the annual
output of nations, but primarily Britain, and how in each country its
capacity to produce the real wealth of a nation (and not the amount of
gold, silver or paper money its citizens or its prince hoarded) would
grow year by year with efficacious policies, gradually, continually and
without direction.
An amount of raw material did not visibly result in a net product in the
same quantitative manner – seeds bore fruit – because the physical
product of raw materials was not visible in a larger amount of something
tangible. Making a saddle out of leather, metal studs and stitching did
not produce more leather. It produced a saddle. The notion that labour
added to raw material produced a higher value and not a larger physical
output required a different perspective, and if I may suggest it, a
higher level of conceptual insight, which some French
économistes
approached, but the majority of Physiocrats did not. The latter treated
manufactured products as ‘sterile’.
Tracing exegetically the origins of this conceptual insight that is now
common place is not my purpose. I shall confine my remarks to the
distinction as understood by Adam Smith.
Smith regarded labour as productive if it contributed to growth of the
net product of wealth. It followed that labour that did not contribute
to the growth of net wealth was unproductive. That this is a narrower
definition than is common place nowadays, which now includes labour
producing intangible services sold in markets, is accepted.
Our understanding of productive labour has matured as the economy
matured from Smith’s fairly simple commercial society of a majority of
farmers, and a minority of journeymen, tradesmen, merchants and
manufacturers, producing food, clothing, shelter, household goods,
implements and trinkets typical of 18th-century living standards and
implements of the 18th century carrying trade and of the implements of
war. The mass consumer and service society of late capitalism and big
government was far ahead of the conceptual horizons of Smith, his
contemporaries and immediate successors. Rothbard’s penetrating 20th-century
hindsight is hardly relevant when judging what Smith should have known,
anticipated or been aware of (e.g., the ‘industrial revolution’), but
which, like all his contemporaries, he did not.
Smith was interested in what caused the growth of wealth. His
identification of productive labour the cause of growth, and
unproductive labour as labour not causing growth, is a simplification
that was not in error for his purposes and its time. He saw the
motivational causes of labour leading to growth as the result of the
frugality of those (like journeyman manufacturers working in small
forges, blacksmith’s shops, saddlers yards and weaving sheds attached to
the labourers’ houses, and such like) whose savings from their revenues
(incomes) from productive activities were re-invested into hiring
productive labour to create tangible products to be sold in markets.
In contrast, those he called the ‘prodigals’ spent from their revenues
to hire domestic hands and consumer goods, which did not produce output
that was sold in markets. The output labour was consumed by the persons
hiring their services in the form of domestic labour that produced a
degree of comfort satisfying the hirers’ urge to indolence and the
trinkets that flattered their egos. To the extent that people were
frugal and investing their savings, the economy would grow; to the
extent that they were prodigal and spent on their consumption the
economy would grow more slowly.
That is all he meant by labour being either productive or unproductive.
It was a distinction with a difference within terms that suited Smith’s
purpose to inquire into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations.
Rothbard concludes from his misunderstanding:
“Clearly, Smith wanted far more investment towards future production and
less present consumption than the market was willing to choose. One of
the contradictions of this position, of course, is that accumulating
more capital goods at the expense of present consumption will eventually
result in a higher standard of living unless Smith prepared to counsel a
perpetual and accelerated shift toward more and more
never-to-be-consumed means of production.”
Again Rothbard misunderstands Smith’s approach. He did not write a
manifesto; he did not advocate, nor expect, that everybody should cease
being prodigal and convert to being frugal, and certainly not that the
state should enforce such a ludicrous proposition. He described what
many people did and what a few did differently, and what the
consequences were from their behaviours in terms of the effect of their
actions on the growth in a nation’s wealth. What people did next, as a
result of understanding the differences in the distinct behaviours, he
left an open question. He always cautioned against ‘men of system’ and
their fanaticism that tolerated no exceptions (a mood or manner of
behaviour, if I may say so, that would incorporate much of the writing
style of Murray Rothbard, based on the extract from his book).
Smith noted that the frugality of income earners in contemporary 18th-
century Britain was sufficient to bring about a gradual, persistent and
steady rate of economic growth in real output (and real wages for common
labourers), sufficiently encouraging for him to believe it could offset
the ‘wasteful’ expenditures (in terms of growth, not civilised comforts)
on the ‘dignity of the sovereign’ and the wars of governments. He did
not advocate a kind of ‘Stalinist’ dash for growth through ‘heavy
industry’ at the expense of consumption.
He happily left to individuals the decision to spend all, or to save
some, of their revenues; implicitly, he suggested the more that
individuals chose to save out of their urge for frugality, the
relatively faster the nation’s growth rate would be, a true proposition
not a falsehood. Contrary to Rothbard’s ‘it’s either investment or
consumption nightmare’ (not a choice in the 18th century), Smith
considered that there was sufficient of each available type of labour to
produce the desired outcome as a trend over time that would enrich the
wealth of the nation.
To this extent, I believe Murray Rothbard’s critique of his version of
Adam Smith’s myths is more a demonstration of Murray Rothbard’s Myths
about Adam Smith.
6
Murray Rothbard wrote his
polemic against Adam Smith entirely based on his reputation as an
Austrian economist, making charge after charge against his target
without giving the kind of detailed evidence support his case expected
from a younger economist yet to make a reputation among professionals
peers.
Rothbard apparently expected his Austrian colleagues and sympathisers
(and others, such as myself, who admire their work without necessarily
subscribing sufficiently to be an affiliate) to accept his, albeit
intemperate, judgements uncritically. However, should his readers be
familiar with Adam Smith’s life and work, they might recoil from his
more extreme criticism, perhaps, as I do, by assessing Rothbard’s
detailed points (on the few occasions where he gives any), which are
clearly incorrect exegetically (as itemised in previous sections) and
are bald generalisations suitable for opinionated journalists.
In this respect, consider Rothbard’s criticism of Adam Smith on what
became known after his death in 1790 as the ‘Industrial Revolution’.
“Smith's use of an example of a small French pin-factory rather than
a larger British one highlights a curious fact about his celebrated
Wealth of Nations: the renowned economist seems to have had no inkling
of the Industrial Revolution going on all about him. Although he was a
friend of Dr John Roebuck, the owner of the Carron iron works, whose
opening in 1760 marked the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in
Scotland, Smith showed no indication that he knew of its existence.
Although he was at least an acquaintance of the great inventor James
Watt, Smith displayed no knowledge whatever of some of Watt's leading
inventions. He made no mention in his famous book of the canal boom
which had begun in the early 1760s, of the very existence of the
burgeoning cotton textile industry, or of pottery or of the new methods
of making beer. There is no reference to the enormous drop in travel
costs that the new turnpikes were bringing about.
In contrast, then, to those historians who praise Smith for his
empirical grasp of contemporary economic and industrial affairs, Adam
Smith was oblivious to the important economic events around him.”
Was Rothbard aware of the conditions in which Smith wrote the bulk of
“Wealth of Nations”, and certainly its first chapters? He was not
writing in a well-endowed University library – he left Glasgow in
January 1764. He wrote on the basis of whatever books he had acquired
privately; he did not have a tenth of the books available to Rothbard in
the last quarter of the 20th century, plus the 200 years of
additional academic research published in journal articles.
Rothbard sneers: “the renowned economist seems to have had no inkling
of the Industrial Revolution going on all about him.”
For a start, Rothbard should
have elaborated on the details of the “the Industrial Revolution going
on all about him” and identified whom among Smith’s contemporaries had
an ‘inkling’ of the Industrial Revolution in the third quarter of the
18th century?
That Smith knew Dr John Roebuck and James Watt is beyond doubt. That he
should have grasped the significance of the Carron Ironworks for a
pending industrial revolution is extravagant. What features of Roebuck’s
investment were progenitors of the power-driven industry of the 19th
century that became known as the Industrial Revolution? Carron was
certainly large scale, but it was not power driven.
T. S.
Ashton declared that the lighting of the furnace at Carron on 26
December 1760 was the day when the industrial revolution began,
but from his well-documented hindsight, not his foresight, and the same
hindsight is found in abundance among scholars, not in 1760, but after
1860 when the contours of industrial development taken together were
visible to all who shared research-fed hindsight from privileged vantage
points, including, of course, Murray Rothbard writing in the 1960s.
James Watt was Glasgow University’s instrument maker and part-time
dabbler in mechanics. Smith taught yards away from Watt’s workshop, but
little of Watt’s future role in the power-driven industrial revolution
was visible to Smith during 1751-1763. The early years of Watt’s
experiments with steam power were related to the pumping of water out of
coal mines (an ancient trade) and not the driving of large factory-based
machinery in the next century.
There has been a long-standing debate among economic historians about
Smith’s awareness of the isolated, separate and dispersed changes slowly
beginning to appear in the last quarter of the 18th century. I discuss
this in more detail in ‘Adam Smith’s Lost Legacy’.
I conclude broadly in favour of Charles Kindleberger’s assessment that
Smith was not aware, nor had he good reason to be so, and that R. M.
Hartwell’s assessment that he was aware is wrong in detail and in his
assertions about the evidence, as were Rothbard’s assertions about
Smith’s lack of foresight.
As for Rothbard’s straws about ‘canals’, Smith discussed their
suitability for public investment; of ‘turnpike roads’ he discussed
their suitability for public or private management in “Wealth of
Nations”,
though there was a long way to go before they would reap large scale
economies of scale. It still took two days to travel from Glasgow to
Edinburgh, a distance of 40 miles, in the 1760s, and the state of most
of Britain’s roads remained chronic well into the 1840s. Smith
recognised importance of roads, for commercial prosperity and he
discussed the advantages of better roads for commercial transport by
six-horse pulled wagons.
As with other details in Rothbard’s polemic, while there is room for
debate about the conclusions we can draw from such details, and opinions
may differ legitimately, I come back to my main charge that Rothbard on
Smith is unfair where he is wrong and dubious when he says something
with which reasonable people might be open minded. Rothbard and his
sympathisers have few grounds for his expressed absolute certainties
about Smith’s alleged myths, given that he created more than a few myths
about Adam Smith himself.
[Murray
Rothbard’s Myths about Adam Smith, Gavin Kennedy, February 2006.
Not for
quotation without permission from the author:
gk@eb.hw.ac.uk.
© Gavin
Kennedy, 2006. All Rights reserved]
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